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their	 potential	 child’s3	 best	 interest.4	 This	 Article	 focuses	 on	 these	
women	and	suggests	a	new	constitutional	grounding	to	protect	their	
abortion	rights.		






on	 the	 love	 they	have	 for	 their	 child.	These	decisions	 are	 currently	
governed	by	ill-fitting	abortion	laws,	under	which	many	state	abortion	
bans	begin	at	the	moment	most	women	first	discover	their	potential	
child’s	 diagnosis.6	 I	 contend	 that	 these	 parents	 have	 an	 additional	
abortion	right—independent	of	a	woman’s	general	right	to	a	pre-via-
bility	abortion—as	parents	making	end-of-life	decisions	for	their	po-

















































birth.	 Otherwise,	 parents	 are	 given	 constitutional	 protection	 from	




















































































































































any	abortion	regulation	that	raises	an	issue	of	 first	 impression,	even	if	 it	greatly	re-
duces	abortion	access.	See	Leah	Litman,	June	Medical	as	the	New	Casey,	TAKE	CARE	BLOG	
(June	 29,	 2020),	 https://takecareblog.com/blog/june-medical-as-the-new-casey	
[https://perma.cc/Z8NR-4FET].	Justice	Ginsburg’s	death	was	announced	as	this	Arti-
cle	was	going	to	press.	See	Rebecca	R.	Ruiz,	Amy	Coney	Barrett	Signed	an	Ad	in	2006	
Urging	Overturning	 the	 ‘Barbaric	 Legacy’	 of	Roe	 v.	Wade,	N.Y.	 TIMES	 (Oct.	 1,	 2020),	
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/us/elections/amy-coney-barrett-roe-v	
-wade.html	 [https://perma.cc/4SQM-RTGD]	 (finding	 that	 President	 Trump	 quickly	

















it	 creates	 a	 slippery	 slope	 to	 personhood.	 Finally,	 this	 Section	 con-













United	 States,	 2004–2006,	 CTRS.	 FOR	DISEASE	CONTROL	&	PREVENTION	 (Nov.	 1,	 2018),	
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/features/birthdefects-keyfindings.html	





(Jan.	 11,	 2008),	 https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5701a2.htm	
[https://perma.cc/LS7U-WSDQ].	




	 32.	 Fetal	 Anomalies,	 MERCY	 (2020),	 https://www.mercy.net/service/fetal	
-anomaly	[https://perma.cc/P6AS-VVJ8].	












agnosis	 could	 fall	 based	 on	 the	 diagnoses’	 severity:	 (1)	those	 that	
cause	 certain,	 and	 likely	 imminent,	 childhood	 death,	 (2)	those	 that	
cause	frequent	childhood	death	with	severe	morbidity	among	survi-











of	 prenatal	 diagnoses.	 They	 will	 resurface	 later	 in	 the	 Article	 as	 a	













	 35.	 For	 instance,	 a	 baby	 can	 develop	 anencephaly,	where	 the	 child’s	 skull	 and	
brain	are	not	formed.	These	babies	cannot	survive.	Facts	About	Anencephaly,	CTRS.	DIS-
















certain—and	 most	 likely,	 imminent—childhood	 death.39	 The	 most	
common	of	these	conditions	include,	for	example,	anencephaly,	where	
the	fetus’s	skull	and	brain	are	not	formed;40	Trisomy	13	or	Trisomy	































	 46.	 Erin	 Digitale,	 Compatible	 with	 Life?,	 STAN.	 MED.	 (2018),	 https://stanmed	
.stanford.edu/2018fall/genetic-disorders-incompatible-life-options.html	[https://	
perma.cc/WNQ3-34R5];	Koogler	et	al.,	supra	note	45,	at	38.	

























is	 somewhere	 between	 83–86%.58	 After	 a	 confirmed	 diagnosis	 of	
 













































before	 they	 can	 survive	 outside	 the	womb.	 Though	 these	 potential	




































mother	 and	 child	 risk	 infection).66	 As	 a	 result,	 as	 many	 as	 half	 of	























days);	 Elsa	 Lorthe,	 Héloïse	 Torchin,	 Pierre	 Delorme,	 Pierre-Yves	 Ancel,	 Laetitia	
Marchand-Martin,	Laurence	Foix-L’Hélias,	Valérie	Benhammou,	Catherine	Gire,	Claude	
















































PREVENTION	 (Nov.	 12,	 2019),	 https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/heartdefects/hlhs.html	
[https://perma.cc/FF55-T3YT].	





































after	 receiving	 a	 severe	 ventriculomegaly	 diagnosis	 (although	 only	
5%	 of	 women	 terminated	 for	 mild	 ventriculomegaly	 and	 25%	 for	
moderate	ventriculomegaly).87	Termination	rates	for	hypoplastic	left	







































frequently	managed	with	 surgery	 or	 other	medical	 treatments,	 but	






Category	 III	 also	 includes	anomalies	 that	 cause	or	 increase	 the	
risk	of	intellectual	disabilities.96	Some	are	mild	versions	of	conditions	
in	Category	II,	like	isolated,	mild	ventriculomegaly,	where	the	fluid	ac-






&	 PREVENTION	 (Dec.	 5,	 2019),	 https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/ul	
-limbreductiondefects.html	[https://perma.cc/2RR4-ZXJX].	




























amined	outcomes	based	on	 this	 distinction	 found	 that	 the	 ten-year	
mortality	rate	for	Trisomy	21	babies	with	congenital	heart	defects	was	














































































































	 116.	 Parham	v.	 J.R.,	442	U.S.	584,	602	(1979);	see	also	Santosky,	455	U.S.	at	745	































































most	 compelling	 reasons.”129	 Otherwise,	 “the	 requisite	 of	 parental	
consent	to	medical	care	for	children	[would]	become[]	meaningless	if	
[simply	the]	refusal	to	consent	automatically	triggers”	state	interven-
tion.130	Though	courts	 faced	with	 these	dilemmas	analyze	 the	 issue	
under	a	BIC	 framework,	 the	Supreme	Court	has	held	that	 there	 is	a	
strong	presumption	that	parents	act	in	their	child’s	best	interest.131	To	
override	parental	choice,	the	state	must	therefore	rebut	this	presump-





























































2019)	 [hereinafter	 Parental	 Treatment	 Refusals],	 https://ascopost.com/issues/july	

































































































chemotherapy[,]	 and	 the	 considerable	 likelihood	 of	 [its]	 failure.”145	
The	court	noted	that	Colin	would	likely	need	multiple	transfusions,	a	







ents	undertake	an	awesome	responsibility	 in	 raising	and	caring	 for	
their	children.	No	doubt	a	parent’s	decision	to	withhold	medical	care	



































coercive	 intrusion	 by	 the	 state	 in	 those	 life-or-death	 situations.”153	


































The	 first	 infant	 case	 that	 reached	 national	 attention	 involved	
Baby	Doe,	who	was	born	in	1982.159	Doe	was	born	with	Down	Syn-
drome	 and	 an	 esophageal	 condition,	 which	 if	 treated,	 would	 have	
saved	the	baby’s	life.160	Doe’s	parents,	however,	chose	to	forgo	the	life-
saving	surgery	and	withhold	hydration	and	nutrition,	allowing	their	

















vented	 hospitals	 from	 withholding	 care	 from	 disabled	 infants;	 the	



























parents	 had	 chosen	 to	 forgo	 treatment.170	 Jane	Doe	was	 born	with	
many	serious	disorders,	including	spina	bifida,	microcephaly,	and	hy-
drocephalus.171	Multiple	 surgeries	 could	 have	 corrected	 the	 hydro-
cephalus	 and	 spina	 bifida,	 but	 the	 parents	 refused	 treatment.172	 A	
court	in	New	York	refused	to	disturb	the	parents’	decision,	noting	that	
the	 “concededly	 concerned	 and	 loving	 parents	 have	 made	 an	 in-
formed,	 intelligent,	 and	 reasonable	 determination	 based	 upon	 and	
supported	 by	 responsible	medical	 authority.”173	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 held	
“the	parents’	determination	to	be	in	the	best	interest	of	the	infant.”174	
An	appeals	court	 in	New	York	affirmed	 this	decision,	 criticizing	 the	
“unusual,	and	sometimes	offensive,	activities,”	which	sought	to	“dis-
place	 parental	 responsibility	 for	 and	 management	 of	 [Jane	 Doe’s]	
medical	care.”175	The	court	found	it	“distressing”	that	parents	facing	







found	 that	 the	 hospitals	 were	 simply	 adhering	 to	 parental	 prefer-










































lations,183	 as	 of	 2015,	 all	 of	 the	 promulgated	 rules	 have	 been	 re-
pealed.184	The	law	now	stands	on	its	own.185	












































parents	 chose	 to	 continue	 the	 pregnancy.193	 For	 these	 babies,	 the	
 
infants	and	so	have	had	to	make	few	changes	in	their	practices”);	George	J.	Annas,	The	


























parents	 and	medical	 team	must	 decide	 on	 a	 course	 of	 action	 after	




















law:	 the	CAA	would	not	 apply	because	 the	 care	would	be	 “futile	 in	
terms	of	the	survival	of	the	infant,”199	and	the	state	could	never	rebut	










at	 1,	 13–14	 https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/106/3/e29	
.full.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/H9Z8-5DFG]	(“Noninitiation	of	resuscitation	 in	 the	deliv-





























derstanding	of	the	prognosis	for	 ‘quality	of	 life’	 for	people	with	Tri-
somy	21.”204	Thus,	for	a	Category	III	diagnosis,	providing	all	life-pro-
longing	treatment	is	the	standard	of	care.	Without	a	doubt,	the	Baby	
Doe	 controversy	 helped	move	 the	 disability	 rights	 perspective	 for-



























Rather,	most	 courts	 today	would	 likely	have	no	hesitation	ordering	
medical	treatment	over	parental	objection	in	these	cases.209		
Though	Category	II	is	harder,	I	think	both	law	and	medicine	agree	
that	 a	 parent’s	 decision	 to	 withdraw	 care	 should	 generally	 be	 re-
spected.	Medical	standards	recognize	that	there	is	no	clear	treatment	
decision	 in	 this	 category—treatment	 is	 neither	 futile	 nor	 obliga-
tory.210	 In	 this	middle	ground,	parents	are	 the	appropriate	decision	
makers.	 The	 American	 Medical	 Association	 has	 said,	 “[p]hysicians	
should	recognize,	and	help	parents	appreciate,	that	it	is	not	necessary	
to	 have	 prognostic	 certainty	 to	withdraw	 life-sustaining	 treatment,	




if	 the	 physician	 believes	 the	 procedure	 in	 question	 should	 be	 per-
formed,	an	informed	parent’s	refusal	should	generally	be	respected”	
unless	“the	chance	of	a	good	outcome	with	the	procedure	is	so	high	
that	 it	 is	 clearly	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 to	 undergo	 the	 proce-
dure.”212	It	has	also	said	that	“[w]hen	the	fetus’	prognosis	is	uncertain,	
decisions	regarding	obstetric	management	must	be	made	by	the	par-

























to	 resuscitate	 the	 infant]	 should	be	 the	main	deciding	 factor.”214	 In	
that	 category,	 the	authors	 listed:	 “[b]abies	who	are	23	 to	25	weeks	
gestation”	 and	 “[b]abies	 with	 major	 abnormalities	 that	 predict	 ex-
treme	morbidity	or	early	death.”215	The	authors	contrasted	this	cate-
gory	with	two	others:	babies	“with	almost	certain	death,”	for	whom	
























in	 such	 situations	 give	 the	wrong	 answer	 since	 there	 is	 no	way	 of	
knowing	the	right	answer?”220	Parents	are	necessarily	making	deci-
sions	“about	which	there	is	no	societal	consensus”	when	they	consider	






































they	do	nothing	more	 than	condition	 federal	 funds	on	 the	develop-
ment	of	procedures	for	the	reporting	of	medical	neglect.227	It	would	



































especially	 after	 states	 have	 banned	 abortion.	 Thus,	 in	 practice,	 this	

















































lem	had	dissipated.240	 In	 the	meantime,	she	settled	 further	 into	her	
pregnancy,	now	knowing	her	baby	was	a	girl.241	
At	twenty-two	weeks,	and	with	thirteen	letters	written	to	her	fu-
ture	daughter,	she	went	 in	 for	her	 follow-up	ultrasound	alone,	con-
vinced	that	she	would	be	in	the	95%.242	Instead,	her	baby	girl	had	de-
veloped	 ventriculomegaly.243	 It	 was	 in	 that	 appointment	 that	 her	
doctors	first	started	discussing	abortion,	specifically	that	Michigan’s	
abortion	 law	only	allowed	 terminations	until	 twenty-four	weeks.244	
That	 day,	 she	 scheduled	 a	 battery	 of	 tests	 and	 appointments—
 
	 234.	 One	 Mom’s	 Late-Term	 Abortion,	 LONGEST	 SHORTEST	 TIME,	 at	 05:30	 (Mar.	1,	































































Because	 abortion	was	now	 illegal	 in	Michigan,	Margot	 and	her	















































margins—attempting	 to	 slowly	 chip	 away	 abortion	 rights	 over	
time.271	However,	 this	model	has	changed	dramatically	after	 Justice	
Kennedy	 retired;	 in	 the	 past	 eighteen	 months,	 conservative	 states	











































In	Roe	 v.	Wade,	 the	Supreme	Court	 first	 recognized	a	 constitu-




structed	 by	 state	 interference.279	 In	 the	 second	 trimester,	 the	 state	









































state	 to	 require	 all	 women	 to	wait	 twenty-four	 hours	 to	 obtain	 an	











Later	 opinions	 have	 affirmed	 the	 health-or-life	 exception,	 but	







between	 these	 two	 rationales—the	 latter	 being	more	 protective	 of	





















































































Since	 Roe	 and	 Casey,	 forty-three	 states	 have	 enacted	 abortion	
bans	that	outlaw	the	procedure	at	some	point	in	the	pregnancy	(un-
less	necessary	to	save	the	health	or	life	of	the	mother).309	One	primary	
way	 that	 states	 have	 attempted	 to	 chip	 away	 at	women’s	 abortion	
















































Given	 these	 statistics,	 viability	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 begin	 before	
twenty-three	weeks—in	Casey’s	words,	there	would	not	be	a	“realistic	
possibility	of	maintaining	and	nourishing	a	life	outside	the	womb.”321	



























women	 first	 discover	 that	 their	 baby	 is	 sick,	 although	 Mississippi,	
Georgia,	Louisiana,	South	Carolina,	and	West	Virginia	have	an	excep-
tion	for	lethal	fetal	anomalies.325	In	fact,	some	of	these	bans	have	been	
promoted	as	a	way	 to	 reduce	abortions	on	 the	basis	of	 fetal	 anom-
aly.326	 There	 are	 an	 additional	 three	 states	 that	 ban	 abortion	 at	
twenty-four	weeks,	which	 gives	women	 a	 little	more	 time,	 but	 not	
enough.327	
Though	 the	 timing	 of	 fetal	 diagnosis	 can	 vary	 greatly,	 parents	
most	commonly	receive	a	fetal	diagnosis	of	an	anatomical	condition	







Most	 anatomical	 conditions	 cannot	 be	 diagnosed	 sooner	 than	 this	
mid-pregnancy	 ultrasound	 because	 the	 organs	 are	 not	 sufficiently	
 






















the	 fetus’s	 increased	 risk	of	having	a	 condition.334	As	a	 result,	 even	
when	parents	utilize	first	trimester	screening,	many	will	not	get	a	di-















STETRICIANS	 &	 GYNECOLOGISTS,	 https://www.acog.org/patient-resources/faqs/special	
-procedures/ultrasound-exams	 [https://perma.cc/7HRN-NK9Z	 ]	 (“A	 first-trimester	
ultrasound	exam	is	not	standard	because	it	is	too	early	to	see	many	of	the	fetus’s	limbs	
and	organs	in	detail.”).	
	 332.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Finn,	 supra	note	251;	The	Mom	Who	Had	an	Abortion	at	7	Months	
Pregnant,	 CUT	 (Apr.	 19,	 2018),	 https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/how-i-got-this	
-baby-mom-who-had-an-abortion-at-7-months.html	[https://perma.cc/YZ8M	
-FMQK];	Sarah	McCammon,	Abortion	in	the	Third	Trimester:	A	Rare	Decision	Now	in	the	




























the	 third	 trimester.340	 For	 the	women	 in	 any	 of	 these	 situations,	 a	









DELAYS	 IN	ACCESSING	 CARE	AMONG	U.S.	ABORTION	 PATIENTS	 3–4	 (2016),	 https://www	
.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/delays-in-accessing-care.pdf	
[https://perma.cc/G9DY-5X4A];	 Rachel	 Bertsche,	What	 Kind	 of	 Mother	 Is	 8	 Months	









Abortions,	 HUFFPOST	 (Feb.	 18,	 2019),	 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/we-are-not	
-monsters-parents-go-public-about-late-term-abortions_l_5c6afe6de4b01cea6b	
8815ff	[https://perma.cc/DY8K-7624];	Bertsche,	supra	note	337;	Jia	Tolentino,	How	























Courts	 have	 overturned	 some	 abortion	 bans	 that	 started	 too	

















state	bans	have	gone	 into	effect);	 see	also	 State	Bans	on	Abortion	Throughout	Preg-





























does	not	 allow	states	 to	ban	pre-viability	 abortions	based	on	 “bad”	
reasons.356		








































































	 366.	 Planned	Parenthood	of	 Ind.	&	Ky.,	 Inc.	 v.	 Comm’r	of	 the	 Ind.	 State	Dep’t	 of	
Health,	888	F.3d	300,	306	(7th	Cir.	2018),	cert.	denied	on	disability-selective	abortion	
























child’s	 genetic	 makeup	 after	 conception,	 aborting	 any	 fetus	 whose	 genes	
show	a	likelihood	that	the	child	will	be	short,	or	nearsighted,	or	intellectually	
average,	or	lack	perfect	pitch—or	be	the	“wrong”	sex	or	race?	Casey	did	not	
address	 that	question.	We	ought	not	 impute	 to	 the	 Justices	decisions	 they	
have	not	made	about	problems	they	have	not	faced.374	








peals.”377	 Justice	Thomas	wrote	separately	 to	suggest	 that	 Indiana’s	


































Nevertheless,	 some	 courts	 have	 “speculated	 that	 the	 Supreme	
Court’s	language	in	Box	implicitly	invited	appellate	judges	to	review	
the	merits	of	prohibitions	of	discriminatory	abortions	.	.	.	.”383	And	it	
appears	this	 invitation	will	be	answered.	 In	 January	2019,	 the	Sixth	
Circuit	heard	an	appeal	to	an	injunction	that	prevented	Ohio’s	disabil-
ity-selective	 abortion	 ban	 from	 going	 into	 effect.384	 Like	 Indiana,	
Ohio’s	ban	was	also	limited	to	Down	Syndrome.385	The	Sixth	Circuit	
also	concluded	that	Ohio’s	ban	violated	Casey’s	“categorical”	right	to	a	
pre-viability	abortion.386	 Judge	Batchelder	dissented,	 largely	 for	 the	






STERILITY	 CONSIDER	 THIS	 (Jan.	 25,	 2020),	 https://www.fertstertdialog.com/posts/	
58704-fox-consider-this	 [https://perma.cc/YQF5-BBYZ];	 see	 also	 Samuel	 R.	 Ba-














2020.389	 Given	 that	 President	 Trump	 has	 appointed	 more	 active	




appear	 anytime	 soon,	 especially	 given	 the	 sympathetic	 ear	 Judge	
Easterbrook,	Judge	Barrett,	and	Justice	Thomas	gave	such	laws391	and	












right—a	parent’s	 right	 to	make	end-of-life	decisions	 for	 their	 child.	













	 390.	 Tim	 Ryan,	Trump	 Flips	 Another	 Circuit	 to	Majority	 GOP	 Appointees,	 COURT-
HOUSE	NEWS	 SERVS.	 (Nov.	 20,	 2019),	 https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-flips	
-another-circuit-to-majority-gop-appointees	[https://perma.cc/UQT9-J64A].	
















fends	 the	analogy	between	parents	and	expectant	parents	 to	 justify	
the	extension	of	the	parental	rights	to	expectant	parents.	It	suggests	




tentially	 life-threatening	diagnosis	 in	their	child,	 they	face	the	same	










fer,	 that’s	 what	 I’m	 going	 to	 choose.	 And	 I	 will	 choose	 it	 every	
day.	.	.	.”398	 Parents	 hope	 to	 save	 their	 child	 from	 the	 suffering	 of	 a	
short	or	painful	life	or	the	years	of	painful	procedures	that	might	still	



















































	 402.	 Allison	 Chang,	Our	 Child	 Received	 a	 Devastating	 Diagnosis	 Before	 She	Was	






















Those	who	choose	 termination	 in	 this	context	 typically	grieve	 their	
potential	 children	 in	 the	 same	 way	 parents	 grieve	 natural	 fetal	
death.408	 It	 can	 be	 devastating.409	 Though	 no	 two	 families	 are	 the	
same,	many	parents	see	their	child	as	forever	a	part	of	their	family:	
“[T]he	 tricky	 thing	 about	 motherhood	 is	 it’s	 a	 transformation	 that	









	 406.	 Missy	 Kurzweil,	 Later	 Abortion:	 A	 Love	 Story,	 JEZEBEL	 (Feb.	21,	 2019),	
https://jezebel.com/later-abortion-a-love-story-1832631748	[https://perma.cc/	
69PT-R939];	see	also	Chelsea	McIntosh,	Opinion:	My	Abortion	Not	Your	Business,	Politi-




me,	 [other	mothers	who	 terminated	 such	 pregnancies]	would	 give	 anything	 to	 ex-
change	their	abortion	for	a	healthy,	living	child.”);	Lunsford,	supra	note	403	(“I	carry	
trauma	with	me	that	is	so	deep	and	intertwined	with	my	soul,	I	know	I	will	never	re-
cover.”);	Ahmed,	 supra	 note	404	 (“[Terminating	 a	wanted	pregnancy]	has	been	 the	
hardest	experience	of	my	life	.	.	.	.	I	will	never	be	the	same.”).	































and	 emotional	 strains	 of	 caretaking	 a	 seriously	 ill	 child.415	 To	 the	
 
	 412.	 See,	e.g.,	Jenny	Kutner,	Women	Who	Have	Had	Abortions	on	Why	They’re	Proud	
















the	parents	believe	 that	existence	could	be	more	painful	 than	 joyful,	 it	would	 fit	an	
exception	to	the	non-identity	problem).	
	 415.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Cassy	 Fiano,	 Selfish	 Convenience:	 Why	 People	 Abort	 Children	 with	























her	 recourse	 in	 a	 post-viability	 pregnancy	 unprotected	 by	 Casey	




















personal	 motives	 when	 deciding	 whether	 to	 withdraw	 or	 withhold	 life-sustaining	
treatment).	
	 417.	 Cf.	Parental	Treatment	Refusals,	supra	note	133	(discussing	a	doctor’s	duty	to	






















































Deepa	 Aggarwal	 &	 Russell	 S.	 Kirby,	National	 Population-Based	 Estimates	 for	 Major	
Birth	 Defects,	 2010–2014,	 111	 BIRTH	 DEFECTS	 RSCH.	 1420,	 1424–26	 tbl.3	 (2019)	
(providing	statistics	showing	Trisomy	21	as	one	of	the	most	common	birth	defects	in	
the	 United	 States),	 and	 Down	 Syndrome,	 MARCH	 DIMES,	 https://www	
.marchofdimes.org/complications/down-syndrome.aspx	[https://perma.cc/R3RU	






























































affirmatively	 causing	 death	 through	 suicide	 was	 traditionally	 con-
demned.436	The	Court	determined	that	“the	two	acts	are	widely	and	
reasonably	 regarded	 as	 quite	 distinct.”437	 Though	 bioethicists	 have	













D&E	abortions,	 physicians	 can	 commence	 the	procedure	by	 cutting	












































tion	 and	 Feticide,	 201	 AM.	 J.	 OBSTETRICS	 &	 GYNECOLOGY	 560.e1,	 560.e4–e5	 (2009)	






























































physician-assisted	 suicide	 only	 permit	 the	 doctor	 to	 prescribe	 life-ending	 drugs	
(known	 generally	 as	 physician-assisted	 suicide)	 but	 not	 to	 administer	 life-ending	













pregnancy	 and	 those	made	 for	 children	after	birth	 is	 that	potential	
children	are	not	people.451	Roe	made	clear	that	fetuses	are	not	persons	































	 455.	 Stillbirth,	 CTRS.	 FOR	 DISEASE	 CONTROL	&	 PREVENTION,	 https://www.cdc.gov/	





























noting	 that	 the	wrongful	death	 laws	“vindicate	 the	parents’	 interest	
and	is	thus	consistent	with	the	view	that	the	fetus,	at	most,	represents	
only	the	potentiality	of	life.”464	This	area	of	the	law	provides	additional	
precedent	 for	 severing	 the	 connection	 between	 personhood	 and	
parenthood.465	
There	has	also	been	a	growing	consensus	that	parenthood	begins	
during	 pregnancy.	 First,	 expectant	 parents	 often	 see	 themselves	 as	
parents	to	their	potential	child;	this	is	especially	true	after	late	preg-
nancy	 loss,	where	expectant	parents	 strongly	 identify	as	parents	 to	
their	deceased	child.466	Denying	the	relationship	that	many	expectant	
parents	 develop	with	 their	 potential	 child	 over	 the	 course	 of	 preg-




















nancy—in	 particular,	 the	 disparate	 burdens	 that	 fall	 on	women.468	
These	 scholars	 note	 that	 expectant	 parents	 are	 making	 parenting	
choices	when	 they,	 for	 instance,	 choose	 and	 assemble	 the	 crib,	 car	
seat,	and	other	essentials,	select	a	pediatrician,	add	their	child	to	day-



















































der[ing]	 the	 discourse	 of	 pregnancy	 loss	 to	 antichoice	 activists.’”477	
This	denial	of	fetal	value	creates	a	disconnect	for	many	women,	even	
those	who	have	not	personally	experienced	 fetal	 loss.	The	reality	 is	
that	women	carrying	wanted	pregnancies—no	matter	how	strongly	
they	support	abortion	rights—frequently	call	 their	fetus	a	baby,	be-





















ration	 of	 a	 child	 into	 its	 family	 during	 pregnancy—commonly	 precedes	 biological	
birth.”).	
	 479.	 CAROL	 SANGER,	 ABOUT	 ABORTION:	 TERMINATING	 PREGNANCY	 IN	 TWENTY-FIRST-




























the	basis	of	 fetal	anomaly	 (albeit	with	 large	 leeway	 to	 the	states	 to	
burden	this	choice).485	After	viability,	on	the	other	hand,	the	Supreme	
Court	has	already	found	that	the	state’s	interest	in	protecting	potential	


































it	 is	 reasonably	 in	 the	potential	 child’s	best	 interest.	Otherwise,	 the	
state	would	have	greater	authority	to	protect	potential	children	(who	







tial	 children.	The	pregnant	woman	 is	giving	 the	potential	 child	 life-
support	through	a	sacrifice	of	her	own	bodily	autonomy	and	health.	
Thus,	any	decision	that	affects	a	potential	child	also	impacts	the	bodily	
autonomy	 of	 the	 expectant	 mother.	 Preventing	 a	 pregnant	 woman	
from	terminating	in	this	context	not	only	forces	both	expectant	par-
ents	to	delay	decisions	they	are	entitled	to	make,	but	also	forces	the	
expectant	 mother,	 specifically,	 to	 endure	 the	 additional	 trauma	 of	
watching	her	belly	 grow	 larger,	 of	 experiencing	 the	discomfort	 and	
risks	of	pregnancy	for	months	against	her	will,	of	confronting	the	loss	
publicly	 every	 time	 a	 stranger	 asks	 about	 the	 pregnancy,	 and	 ulti-






also	 has	 the	 right	 to	 bodily	 autonomy	 that	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 tie-
breaker.488	 The	 rights	 are	 therefore	 layered:	 both	parents	 have	 the	
right	 to	make	 end-of-life	 decisions	 for	 their	 child,	 but	 because	 the	
woman	is	sustaining	the	potential	child’s	life	with	her	own	body,	she	




erty	 than	on	 the	 father’s.	The	effect	of	 state	 regulation	on	a	woman’s	pro-
tected	liberty	is	doubly	deserving	of	scrutiny	in	such	a	case,	as	the	State	has	


















tential	 child,	while	 the	 state’s	 interests	 are	weaker.	As	 a	 result,	 ex-
pectant	parents	who	terminate	on	the	basis	of	a	Category	I	or	II	diag-
nosis	should	be	protected	at	least	to	the	same	extent	as	the	parents	of	








ents	 and	 expectant	 parents	 support	 more	 expansive	 rights	 for	 ex-
pectant	parents,	especially	expectant	mothers.	Therefore,	the	parental	
autonomy	rights	of	expectant	parents	should	be	protected	at	least	to	













	 489.	 Casey,	 505	U.S.	 at	 896	 (citations	 omitted)	 (quoting	 Planned	 Parenthood	 of	
Cent.	Mo.	v.	Danforth,	428	U.S.	at	71).		
	 490.	 Cullen-Delsol,	supra	note	420.	

















ity	 began	 to	 change.494	 The	 disability	 rights	 movement	 was	 in	 full	
swing—only	years	away	from	the	passage	of	the	Americans	with	Dis-
abilities	Act.495	The	anti-choice	community	saw	potential	to	suppress	









Tensions	between	 the	 reproductive	 rights	 and	disability	 rights	














DER	 425,	 431	 (2006);	 Lawrence	D.	 Brown,	Civil	 Rights	 and	 Regulatory	Wrongs:	 The	
Reagan	Administration	and	the	Medical	Treatment	of	Handicapped	Infants,	11	J.	HEALTH	
POL.	POL’Y	&	L.	231,	233–35	 (1986);	C.	Everett	Koop,	Life	and	Death	and	 the	Handi-
















fort	 with	 any	 effort	 that	 could	 diminish	 the	 value	 of	 disabled	 fe-
tuses.504		
This	 Article’s	 reconceptualization	 of	 abortion	 based	 on	 fetal	
anomaly	as	a	parental	autonomy	right	is	vital	to	repositioning	the	pro-
















































By	 changing	 the	 framing,	 the	 pro-choice	 community	 can	 avoid	
any	claim	that	the	right	to	abortion	on	the	basis	of	severe	fetal	anom-
aly	 is	 the	only	 compassionate	choice—it’s	not—but	 that	 it	 is	one	of	
many	reasonable	choices	that	should	be	protected.	This	move	will	en-





reproductive-justice	 framework.	 First,	 presenting	 disability	 as	 an	 obvious	
reason	 to	pursue	abortion	creates	 tensions	between	 the	pro-choice	move-
ment	and	potential	allies	in	the	disability-rights	movement	.	.	.	.	By	simply	fall-







below	some	minimally	 acceptable	 threshold,	Crossley	 suggests	 that	
“[f]amily	 support	 and	 advocacy	 can	 play	 an	 invaluable	 role	 in	 the	
flourishing	 of	 persons	 with	 disabilities,	 both	 individually	 and	
 
	 506.	 Jeffrey	Shulman,	Who	Owns	the	Soul	of	the	Child?:	An	Essay	on	Religious	Par-































	 	 This	 approach	 shifts	 the	 discussion	 away	 from	 individual	 and	 private	
family	decisions—something	public	 policy	 shies	 away	 from—to	 a	 broader	
debate	about	the	kinds	of	services,	education,	and	supports	families	and	in-























stereotypes	 that	 paint	 women	 as	 selfish	 decision	 makers	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 abortion	 decisions,	 but	 selfless	 decision	 makers	 when	 it	
comes	to	parenting	decisions—i.e.,	by	presuming	that	mothers	are	al-







Abrams	 suggests	 that	 “crossing	 longstanding	 boundaries	 [between	
abortion	and	parenting]	may	be	necessary	to	move	the	movement	for-
ward.”521		
Abrams	advocates	 for	 “[a]	unified	 framing	of	 reproductive	and	
parenting	 decision-making.	.	.	.”522	 She	 argues	 this	 framing	 “would	
powerfully	 debunk	 troublesome	 and	 demonizing	myths	 about	why	
women	terminate	pregnancies.”523	It	would	also	“challenge[]	the	mo-






























bining	 parental	 autonomy	 and	 reproductive	 rights	 into	 one	 frame-
work.	Reproductive	justice	advocates	push	for	reproductive	freedom	
as	a	whole,	beyond	abortion	care,	 including	“(1)	 the	right	 to	have	a	
child;	(2)	the	right	not	to	have	a	child;	and	(3)	the	right	to	parent	the	
children	we	have,	as	well	as	to	control	our	birthing	options,	such	as	
midwifery.”527	 The	 reproductive	 justice	 paradigm	 was	 an	 intersec-




communities	 are	 frequently	 prevented	 from	 having	 children	 they	
want,	giving	birth	in	the	manner	they	prefer,	and	raising	their	children	
without	 intervention	 from	the	state.529	The	right	 to	abortion	on	the	
basis	of	severe	fetal	anomaly	fits	nicely	at	the	intersection	of	the	right	
to	 parent	 and	 the	 right	 not	 to	 have	 a	 child,	 as	 it	 promotes	 both	
equally.530		
This	Article	takes	a	step	toward	a	more	unified	way	of	thinking	
about	 abortion	and	parenting	decisions	by	highlighting	one	 area	 in	
which	the	decision-making	is	analogous.	It	also	helps	to	dispel	the	self-
ish	mother	narrative	that	surrounds	abortion	decisions.	Finally,	it	of-
fers	 an	 approach	 that	 may	 be	 appealing	 to	 both	 the	 reproductive	
 








papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577227	 (describing	 the	 new	 focus	
women	of	color	brought	to	the	reproductive	justice	movement	starting	in	the	1990s).	



















prove	 that	 the	 refusal	 is	 against	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest.	 Unfortu-
nately,	 these	same	end-of-life	decisions	when	made	before	a	child’s	
birth	have	been	governed	by	abortion	law,	even	though	the	doctrine	
is	ill-fitting	and	restricts	parental	autonomy	rights.	This	Article	argues	
that	the	parental	right	to	withdraw	life-sustaining	treatment	for	their	
child	must	be	extended	to	expectant	parents	before	birth.	In	practice,	
this	would	mean	that	expectant	parents	have	a	constitutional	right	to	
terminate	a	pregnancy,	even	after	viability,	if	the	termination	is	based	
on	a	life-threatening	fetal	anomaly.	This	right	would	supplement	other	
abortion	rights,	including	the	right	to	an	abortion	before	viability	for	
any	reason	as	articulated	in	Planned	Parenthood	v.	Casey.	
	
